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1. Introduction 
The recent impacts of Hurricane Sandy brought many issues to the public sphere especially in 
regards to climate change and human adaptation to natural disasters. Coastal disasters stemming from 
hurricanes, floods or Nor’easters have become frequent occurrences. Climate models predict a rise in sea 
level and an increase in temperature that indicate an increase in frequency and magnitude of extreme 
weather events (Knutson, 2013). The range of predictions for sea level rise by 2100 is .6 to 6.6 feet (7.1 
in the Appendix). Even a small rise in sea level can have detrimental effects on a coastal community. 
Thirty-nine percent of the American population lives in coastal zones (NOAA, 2012a). Efforts to 
mitigate potential hazard impacts in flood-prone areas should be taken, and to a certain extent they are. 
However, in areas prone to natural hazards the United States continues to build and rebuild after hazard 
events, allowing exposure to grow. It is necessary to address this issue. Current natural hazard policy 
focuses on response rather than avoidance. In light of predictions for an increase of disaster events we 
must reconsider current policy to focus more on how to avoid disaster rather than how to react to 
disaster. Coastal retreat needs to be addressed.  
 “Disasters are often used as windows of opportunity to rebuild more safely than before. The 
United States, however, tends to rebuild after disasters as quickly as possible, often recreating or 
worsening the level of vulnerability that allowed the disaster to happen” (Platt, pg. 2, 2000). U.S. land 
use policy does not adequately address potential futures or the sustainability of development in our 
regulatory actions after large disaster events, which can create a similar disaster scenario for future 
inhabitants.  
American land-use policy has enacted zoning measures on new development in hazard prone 
areas under the term “safe construction practices” (for example: minimum elevation required or 
strengthening against wind damage), but measures to restrict building in these zones have been 
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backpedaled in response to a national increase in property rights organizations (PROs). These grassroots 
organizations proliferated in the 1990’s in reaction to government regulation on new development for 
environmental, or other purposes, without compensation (Platt, 1999). Responding in fear that non-
compensatory restrictions on properties in hazard zones may be held as “takings” under the Fifth 
Amendment (“Nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation”), the U.S. 
government has allowed development to continue in hazard prone areas, albeit with “safe construction 
practices” tacked on in recent cases (Platt, 1999). Government fear of doling out “just compensation” for 
properties located in hazard zones increased public exposure to natural disasters and modified American 
hazard policy to one of response rather than one of avoidance. It gave owners the right to continue 
building on their property and in turn promoted higher population densities that are increasingly more 
vulnerable. Furthermore, the government’s reaction to PROs cannot address the issue of vulnerable 
populations on already developed land and restricts efforts to alleviate future burdens of climate change 
predictions.   
Given the current frequency of coastal natural disasters and predicted increases in their 
magnitude and frequency, it is apparent that mitigation and preparedness for such events be analyzed in 
a comprehensive way to determine the best approach for planning for disasters in coastal regions. The 
objectives of this paper are to (1) assess how the U.S. came to favor a policy of disaster response, (2) 
compare and contrast different approaches to coastal retreat, (3) address the benefits and drawbacks of 
policy options available to legislators and (4) analyze selected coastal states for their degree of 
willingness to retreat from the coast.    
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2. Literature Review: the Impact of American Policy Decisions 
In order to understand hazard policy decisions in America we must first address its history of 
natural and man-made hazards, highlighting the government response to these events. The enactment of 
the first natural hazard policy in America stems from a string of accidents that occurred under the 
laissez-faire and free enterprise mentality of the early 20th century.  Progressive reform and regulation of 
the “invisible hand” attracted many mainstream middle class Americans; this movement to enact more 
government regulation over corporations and private interest solidified its presence after two shocking 
man-made disasters, namely the burning of the Triangle Shirt Waist factory in New York City, 1911, 
and the sinking of the Titanic, 1912: both of these disasters were brought on by poor planning and 
human error. The 10-story Triangle Shirt Waist factory was too tall for firefighting technology of the era 
to handle, resulting in 146 casualties. The Titanic only provided enough emergency lifeboats for half of 
its capacity resulting in 1,635 deaths. The number of lifeboats provided was due to the hubris of its 
maker, the White Star Line, who boasted that the ship was unsinkable (Platt, 1999). The U.S. 
government soon enacted regulations on building height and helped strengthen international 
requirements for safety at sea. The reaction to these events marked an increase in government regulation 
on private activity and common law nuisance (an activity that is harmful or annoying to others, 
regulated after a nuisance is identified) to avoid similar occurrences.  
A few years after these incidents, questioning the efficacy of common law nuisance itself, 
Professor Ernst Freund of the University of Chicago Law School posed that reasonable government 
regulation of private activity—the “police power”—was needed to safeguard the public: 
 The common law of nuisance deals with nearly all the more serious flagrant  
 violations of the interests which the police power protects, but it deals with  
 evils only after they have come into existence, and it leaves the determination 
 of what evil is very largely to the particular circumstance of each case. The  
 police power endeavors to prevent evil by checking the tendency toward it 
 and it seeks to place a margin of safety between that which is permitted and that  
 which is sure to lead to injury or loss. This can be accomplished to some extent  
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 by establishing positive standards and limitations which must be observed, although 
 to step beyond them would not necessarily create a nuisance at common law.     
 
Public intervention and regulation by the government after this questioning of common law nuisance 
increased, leading to the establishment of zoning laws and urban reform. In 1916, New York City 
adopted the first comprehensive urban land use zoning law; a decade later it had spread to several 
hundred cities (Platt, 1999). One influential case in the expansion of land use zoning was the 1926 
decision in the case Amber Realty v. Village of Euclid, where the practice of urban land use zoning was 
upheld by the court (since referred to planners as “Euclidean Zoning”).   
During the same breadth of time, many coastal/water-related hazards were reported: the 
Galveston Hurricane of 1900, the Miami Hurricane of 1926, the Lower Mississippi Flood of 1927, and 
the New England Hurricane of 1938. Yet, no government regulation of the era addressed the issue of 
zoning in areas prone to flood. Government regulations separated condominiums from single-family 
homes and kept adult bookstores away from elementary schools but did not regulate the location of 
communities in areas of natural hazard risk. The government did, however, build massive works and 
undergo projects to protect communities from natural disasters.  
2.1 Flood Control Act of 1927 
After the Mississippi Flood of 1927, which inundated 27,000 square miles of land with as much 
as 30 feet of water (Risk Management Solutions, 2007) Congress established the Flood Control Act of 
1927 (FCA). It called for a “taming of the nation’s rivers”. The projects that emanated from this act were 
questionable in their breadth and did not meet the criteria of the Mississippi River Commission (MRC), 
an influential group of concerned civil engineers (Pearcy, 2002). The American government during the 
passing of the FCA was very conservative, making the issue of whether or not the Federal government 
should intervene in disasters a highly debated topic. Previously, natural disasters were seen as “Acts of 
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God” and mostly funded and under the purview of charitable donations, volunteers, local authorities, 
and churches (Platt, 1999). On May 15, 1928, President Coolidge signed the FCA of 1928 stating that 
the Federal government – not the state or local authorities—were responsible for the containment of the 
Lower Mississippi River (Risk Management Solutions, 2007). This had great implications for the role 
federal government played concerning disasters and led to other federally funded acts and programs that 
furthered their responsibility. 
2.2 The Federal Disaster Relief Act  
 In 1950, Congress passed the Federal Disaster Relief Act (FDRA). Unlike the FCA, the FDRA 
specifically addressed disaster recovery and assistance, giving the President, at the request from a 
governor, the power to supplement disaster scenarios with federal assistance, as well as the power to 
decide when an event was significant enough to warrant federal assistance (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, n.d.). The act stated that federal disaster assistance would “supplement the efforts 
and available resources of the state and local governments” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
n.d.), federal government only intervening if the disaster became large enough to warrant its assistance. 
Furthermore, a contingency for federal involvement was placed on the condition that states and local 
governments invested a reasonable amount of funding into disaster relief; this amount was relative to the 
area in question (Federal Emergency Management Agency, n.d.). 
The purpose of the FDRA was to “provide for an orderly and continuing method of rendering 
assistance to the state and local governments in alleviating suffering and damage resulting from a major 
peacetime disaster… and in restoring public facilities and in supplementing whatever aid the state or 
local governments can render themselves” (Platt, pg. 12, 1999). Although the act only authorized $5 
million for funds allocated to disaster relief (Platt, 1999), it marked a new era of how the government 
views disaster events and provided at least a minimal measure of government intervention and a new 
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model for future disaster laws.  
2.3 The Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program 
In 1953 the Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program (SBADLP) was established 
under the Small Business Act. When a disaster strikes, the SBADLP is automatically activated and 
citizens or business owners that have incurred a loss are eligible to take out a loan at a low rate. The 
purpose of this is to ensure that people can get back to their way of life quickly after a disaster and 
rebuild their business or home (Riviera, 2012). However, the SBADLP supports the permanent 
placement of a house or business by giving those eligible an extra 20% of their loan total towards 
mitigation measures that will hopefully prevent future property loss (Small Business Administration, 
2011). The SBADLP does support mitigation efforts but does not encourage the movement out of hazard 
prone areas.   
2.4 The National Flood Insurance Program 
1956 ushered in the era of the flood insurance program, and for good measure; Ninety percent of 
all disasters in the United States are flood related (Platt, 1999). The true measures of this program were 
not realized until the mid 1960s, but the effects it has had on the distribution and development of coastal 
communities would suggest that it has been around much longer. Following a string of flooding events 
that cost the federal government a fortune to clean up (in association with large increases in the money 
allocated for federal response actions under the FDRA), Congress, with support from the Task Force on 
Federal Flood Control Policy, began looking for other ways to defer costs of hazard cleanup on property 
owners themselves (Platt, 1999). The answer was the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  
The NFIP was designed to offer property owners flood insurance at low cost, however, insurance 
was only provided to communities that took action to decrease their vulnerability to flooding. This was 
meant to encourage smart development in flood-prone areas but actually had negative consequences that 
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will be discussed soon. The NFIP was small at first but expanded its scope under the Flood Protection 
Act of 1973 (FPA), which required property owners to purchase flood insurance policies if they were 
receiving federal funding involving flood prone property. This drastically increased the number of 
people with government flood insurance policies, and also, at first, allowed for disaster cleanup to fund 
itself (Platt, 1999). However, by 1997 the program was in debt for a total of $1.1 billion and still only 
covered an estimated 20 to 25 percent of flood prone properties. One of the main criteria for instituting 
the NFIP was the assumption that it would maintain itself (Maher, 2008). This is not the case anymore 
as extensive coastal and riparian flooding has exacted high tolls for the repair and rebuilding of damaged 
property and a relatively low number of flood prone properties pay into the plan.  
There are many problems with the NFIP. One concern is the relatively high rate of repetitive 
losses. A repetitive loss property is one that has received two or more claim payments over $1,000 in a 
ten-year period (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2007). These properties are costly for 
taxpayers and pose a high risk to residents who may be threatened by continual flooding. In a report 
done by the National Wildlife Federation 774 communities were identified that had a history of 
repetitive losses. Between 1978 and 1993 8,000 properties received 24,800 insurance claims totaling to 
$291 million (National Wildlife Federation, 1998). One property in Houston has been flooded 16 times 
and awarded a total of $807,000 in repairs, which is more than seven times its market value (Warrick, 
2002). Repeatedly paying for the price to repair a property that has been flooded over and over is a 
waste of resources and residents should be encouraged to move out of these areas. But, given the 
government fear of having to take a stand on buying out property that poses a public nuisance, little has 
been done.  
This fear can be seen in the formulation of the NFIP. Private insurance companies increase the 
premiums on properties once a property takes damage. This is not the case in the NFIP and the reason is 
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to maintain affordability. Most private insurers have ceased flood insurance policies due to the inability 
to afford the hefty price of covering claims from extensive flooding events, forcing the government 
hand. This lack of increasing premiums negates the other reasons for the introduction of NFIP, the desire 
to support sound development practices and decrease vulnerability in flood prone regions. In keeping the 
insurance premium at the same rate, property owners that have incurred repetitive losses have no 
monetary incentive to relocate. The government will keep paying for these losses. Increasing insurance 
premiums would promote could create more negative incentive to relocate after a disaster.   
Government provision of flat rate insurance premiums presents a moral hazard. The government 
is trying to decrease vulnerability and provide relief from natural hazard events through the passing of 
legislation and allocating government funding. What is occurring though is sustained vulnerability and 
the lengthening of time needed to relocate populations into residential areas that have lower-
probabilities of hazard risk.  Repetitive loss is more prolific than the above findings in the National 
Wildlife Federation study would have us think. Approximately 37% of repetitive loss properties flooded 
three or more times, payments totaled to $1.4 billion (53% of repetitive loss payments) (Platt, 1999). 
The NFIP is deteriorating is own capability to collect payments by not addressing the real issue: that 
solutions need to be found to relocate these populations where they are not a threat to themselves or a 
burden on taxpayers.  
2.5 The Stafford Act 
The next prominent act to pass through congress was the Stafford Act. The objectives of the 
Stafford act are as follows: 
(1) Revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief programs; (2) encouraging the 
development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and assistance plans…;  (3) achieving greater 
coordination and responsiveness of disaster preparedness and relief programs;  (4) encouraging 
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individuals, states, and local governments to protect themselves by obtaining insurance coverage…; (5) 
encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from disasters, including development of land 
use and construction regulations…; (6) and providing federal assistance programs for both public and 
private losses sustained in disasters. 
    --Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013 
 
Notably, the Stafford Act officially established that 75% of the damage done by major natural 
hazards falls under the responsibility of federal government (Platt, 1999). This is a large extension of the 
federal role in natural disasters. Increasing the federal responsibilities and funding during a natural 
hazard event is a good measure that allows communities to return to normalcy faster without the stress 
of finding funding. But the Stafford Act also requires that damaged properties be built in the same 
location, to the exact same building code standard (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2013), 
furthering the moral hazard. The Stafford Act is a non-progressive approach at redevelopment post-
disaster and it is hard to imagine a community gathering in support of rebuilding a 70-year old hospital 
or a 40-year old school or the two-lane bridge that backed traffic up for miles on a daily basis. The act 
could at least use funding to build structures that have a higher resilience to floods. The Stafford Act 
disregards positive planning for changes needed and also maintains that the best solution is to rebuild in 
a hazard-prone area. The moral hazard is repeated. Instead of finding other solutions to relocate people 
to less vulnerable areas the U.S. government continues to put them in harm’s way, at the expense of 
taxpayer’s, and continues to not address the real issues. While the Stafford Act does have many positive 
aspects in terms of emergency response and the allocation of federal funding, it is no milestone in the 
prevention of future risks. An increase in federal funding does not necessarily equal a better solution.  
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3. Selected Methods of Relocation 
Despite federal insistence that communities be rebuilt in hazard areas as they were prior to loss, 
coastal communities and states are not powerless to address coastal hazards. There are ways to acquire 
property that has been damaged by flood events but, as of plans implemented to this day, the owner of 
the property has to voluntarily sell. The acquisition of property is most effective at reducing flood losses 
before a disaster strikes (Lewis, 2012). After disasters, long-term decisions are harder to make, as the 
community generally wants to get their lives put back together again and return to normalcy. Questions 
of whether rebuilding is the best strategy are waylaid as the sense of urgency abounds (Lewis, 2012). 
However, in most cases, it seems to take a disaster for the planning of the acquisition of property to take 
place. In the next subsections I will discuss one program that was enacted post-disaster and one plan that 
has been laid out pre-disaster and highlight their differences.  
3.1 The Road Home Program 
One such acquisition project implemented after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was Louisiana’s 
Road Home Program. The program was not intended to reduce the vulnerability of coastal populations: 
it was designed to compensate residents for losses incurred. Roughly 10,000 households voluntarily 
relocated under this initiative but over 200,000 households were destroyed. Congress replied to this 
disaster with $11.5 billion allocated for states along the Gulf Coast with Louisiana receiving $6.5 billion 
at first, an additional $3 billion later from Congress, and another $1.2 billion from the Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program. The money was pooled to provide assistance to the Homeowner Assistance Program in 
rebuilding communities that suffered the most losses. Homeowners had 3 options to receive their 
benefits: 1) rebuild 2) sell and purchase another home in Louisiana or 3) sell and purchase a home out of 
state (Lewis, 2012; Road Home Program, 2006). 
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There are some concerns with this program though. Those that chose option 1 (rebuild) were not 
required to rebuild with mitigation techniques, such as elevating their house, although more funding was 
given to those who would go through with recommended mitigation actions. Ninety-two percent of 
those whose claims were accepted chose to rebuild, and 25% of those chose to go ahead with the 
recommended mitigation (Lewis, 2012; Road Home Program, 2006). Those choosing the first option 
were compensated fully for their loss. Eight percent chose to relocate. But those who did decide to 
relocate were undercompensated for their losses, which could have incentivized the option to stay for 
many. Homeowners that selected option 2 (sell and remain in state) were subject to an automatic 30% 
reduction in compensation price if they did not have flood insurance and, as noted in the previous 
section, the majority of homeowners do not have flood insurance. Those who chose option 3 (sell and 
move out of state) could receive no more than 60% of the value of their home. Homeowners who chose 
option 2 were subject to the same 40% penalty of those who chose option 3 if they could not find a new 
house within 180 days (Lewis, 2012; Road Home Program, 2006). 
The options posed to homeowners gave preference to those who wished to stay by penalizing 
them the least. This incited no financial incentive to relocate. However, the Road Home Program was 
relatively effective in comparison to other programs. The relocation of 10,000 households and the 
acquisition of their property has been greatest success thus far in terms of residents moving out of 
vulnerable areas in any program. 
3.2 The Mississippi Coastal Improvement Program  
There are plans that focus on relocation prior to a hurricane event but as of now they are not 
funded. The Mississippi Coastal Improvement Program (MsCIP) is most ambitious of these as it calls 
for the relocation of a vulnerable 75-mile stretch of developed area located on the Gulf Coast (see 7.2 in 
Appendix). The MsCIP recognizes the problems of “significant damage to structures and 
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infrastructure… due to hurricane-induced storm surge, significant erosion of the coastal landscape with 
subsequent damage to … man-made infrastructure” and the opportunity to “reduce the susceptibility or 
residential, commercial, and public structures and infrastructure to hurricane-induced storm damages” 
(Army Corps of Engineers, 2009), rather than only trying to compensate owners for their losses. The 
MsCIP would provide a significant risk reduction to over 58,000 parcels within the 100-year floodplain 
and would restore over 30,000 acres of coastal habitats that also serve as an absorptive buffer for storm 
surge (Army Corps of Engineers, 2009). This will affect 15,000 residential and commercial structures 
that are in the high hazard area (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2009). The MsCIP highlights the need 
for the voluntary acquisition of properties but does not exclude the use of eminent domain (a 
government ordered buyout of property that poses a public nuisance), which is needed in order to 
successfully relocate residents to areas of less hurricane-induced risk.  
There are two phases recommended for the MsCIP that span 30-40 years. These are noted in the 
Long Term High Hazard Risk Reduction Plan (HARP). Phase I will seek to buyout 2,000 of the existing 
15,000 high-hazard properties, targeting those that are currently undeveloped so as to decrease the 
probability of new development. Phase II is automatically initiated when a hurricane hits the area and 
starts the action of “wide-scale relocation” (Lewis, 2012). The reason for this is that reconstruction of 
properties after Hurricane Katrina and Rita have come too far to prompt the voluntary relocation of a 
significant number of residents. Residents have complained that the program is “too much, too late” 
(Lewis, 2012). In order to balance the needs of the public it was determined that eminent domain would 
not come into play until after a hurricane event and prior to future reconstruction of damaged buildings 
(Army Corps of Engineers, 2009; Lewis, 2012). 
One very significant finding in the cost/benefit analysis of HARP and the environmental impact 
statement is “the recognition that acquisition is a more cost-effective long term strategy than protection 
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of properties in high-hazard areas through seawalls, levees and other structural means” (Lewis, pg. 128, 
2012). Yearly damages to property were expected to range from $22-$23 million and Phase I of the 
acquisition was estimated to cost $24 million per year, but only over the span of five years (Army Corps 
of Engineers, 2009). The yearly estimates for property damage would continue far past a five-year span.  
MsCIP is a refreshing take on government initiative to retreat from the coast. By conceding that 
coastal populations are at risk to coastal hazards and addressing the plan prior to hurricane events the 
MsCIP furthers the ability of similar programs to be established by increasing the knowledge of planners 
and those who are affected. While the buyout does await for the next hurricane event to fully relocate 
the population in the 100-year floodplain, like the Road Home Program, the best way to fully relocate a 
population in this type of acquisition is to have the system already in place prior to a hurricane event. By 
having the system in place, the likelihood of attaining federal funding for a buyout of the high hazard 
area increases and the overall vulnerability to hurricane events of the American population decreases.  
4. State Policy Options to Address Sea Level Rise 
There are many policy options that states can take to prevent increased vulnerability to coastal 
populations. States/communities must decide, in a case-by-case analysis, whether to defend shoreline 
properties/communities or allow them to be taken by the sea. Each option has its own benefits and 
drawbacks within a situated place (See 7.3 in the Appendix). Some communities may not have a choice 
in the matter as regulatory measures on development, or shoreline armoring have been in place for 
decades. Properties that have had shoreline armoring for decades, in the form of dikes or seawalls, may 
not easily be able to switch to a living shoreline or retreat approach if erosion and natural processes have 
already made the transition uneconomical or work intensive. The seawall may be the only thing 
protecting the community from the high tide.  
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4.1 Defensive Policy Options 
Defensive policy options include shoreline armoring, beach nourishment, or living shorelines. In 
the following subsections I will highlight the benefits and drawbacks of each approach. This will include 
environmental and property concerns as well as each option’s ability to reduce vulnerability to coastal 
populations.  
 
4.1.1 Shoreline Armoring 
Shoreline armoring protects development with structures such as dikes, seawalls or bulkheads. 
The use of such structures is common in many coastal communities with a history of flooding. There are 
a two well-documented benefits to shoreline armoring. However, these mainly benefit the property 
owner, and only for so long. (1) Shoreline armoring can retain the value of waterfront property and (2) is 
currently preserving millions of dollars worth of real estate in coastal communities (O'Connell, 2010; 
Titus, 2011). Conversely, real estate just inland of these properties is significantly less. One drawback in 
this is that as shoreline armoring increases even coastal properties see a decrease in real estate value 
(O'Connell, 2010; Titus, 2011).  
Environmental impacts from the use of shoreline armoring will increase as sea level rises (Rodil 
et al., 2008). As beaches narrow between the sea and armored infrastructure critical habitat and 
vegetation is lost (Schlacher et al., 2007). Loss of habitat from shoreline armoring has been associated 
with significant two- to 36-fold impacts on beach zones, macroinvertebrates, foraging shorebirds, and 
roosting gulls and seabirds on open coast beaches (Rodil et al., 2008). Also, many beneficial functions 
of coastal ecosystems are lost with the addition of shoreline armoring; inland sediment loads become 
trapped behind infrastructure increasing erosion rates on the seaward side and further down the coast 
(NOAA, 2012b); beaches, a main economic attraction for many coastal communities, recede (NOAA, 
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2012); the absorption of wave energy by coastal vegetation and sand dunes decreases (Defeo et al., 
2009); and the reflection of wave energy by hard structures increases (Holmes, 2001), posing more 
potential risk to coastal communities as sea level increases.  
 Shoreline armoring has immediate benefits, and if preservation of a coastal community is the 
desired action then shoreline armoring is a means to a time-bound end. As sea level rises, communities 
relying on shoreline armoring increase their vulnerability. Climate models are calling for a .6-6.6 foot 
rise in sea level by the year 2100. Policy should reflect this by requiring property lines to retreat as the 
sea rises. While the existence of shoreline armoring may lessen the severity of near term storm events, 
their use is an ill adaptation for long-term planning against predicted sea level rise.   
4.1.2 Beach Nourishment 
Beach nourishment is the practice of building up the beach with sand dredged from other 
locations. The process preserves property lines and increases beach width, protecting property from 
storm surge and maintaining tourism revenue. Beach nourishment is favored over shoreline armoring 
both economically and environmentally (Defeo et al., 2009).  
Beach nourishment is an ongoing investment and needs to be redone periodically depending on 
local erosion rates. Rates of erosion vary depending on local factors, and the durability of nourishment is 
questionable. 26% of replenished US Atlantic Coast barrier island beaches effectively disappear in less 
than one year, 62% last between two and 5 years, and 12% remain for more than five years (Daniel, 
2001). Depending on the rate of erosion, beach nourishment can become costly. Between 1950 and 2002 
the U.S. spent at least $2.5 billion on beach nourishment (In $2002). Analysis of federal expenditures 
shows a trend that more federal money is invested yearly today than before. Federal appropriations 
between 1995 and 2002 accounted for more than half of this $2.5 billion ($787 million) (Smith et al., 
2009). Increases in yearly expenditure can mean (1) more beaches are being nourished, (2) the amount 
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of developed coastal property is increasing or (3) the rate of coastal erosion is increasing. The answer is 
a combination of all three. When does the cost of beach nourishment outweigh protection for coastal 
communities? 
 Environmental costs to beach nourishment are a concern and impacts are seen at both the 
dredging and receiving environments. Recovery of ecosystems does occur after initial disturbance. The 
rate of recovery in the receiving environment is dependent upon sediment quality and sediment pairing 
between the two environments: foreign fine grain sediment mixed with coarse sediment may cause 
severe ecological impacts and hinder or cease recovery (Defeo et al., 2009). Environmental impacts of 
beach nourishment are less than coastal armoring, but great care is needed to ensure ecosystem recovery.        
4.1.3 Living Shorelines 
Living shorelines are a recent addition to coastal mitigation technology. The process uses plants, 
sand, oyster reefs, and limited use of rock to stabilize the shoreline (decrease erosion) and protect and 
maintain valuable habitat. Living shorelines improve water quality from the filtration of upland runoff, 
provide a buffer zone to absorb wave impacts from storm surge, and are often less costly than beach 
nourishment or shoreline armoring projects (CCRM, 2013; Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2007; NOAA, 
2013). They have many benefits, but, its application cannot mitigate loss in areas that experience high 
wave energy (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2007). Even so, many states are investing in living 
shorelines. California, North Carolina, New York, Maryland, and Delaware all have ongoing projects. 
Living shorelines are a way to strike a balance between the need to provide protection from the coast 
with the need to preserve natural ecosystems.    
4.2 Policy Options for Retreat 
Policy options for retreat include minimum setbacks from the coastline and rolling easements. 
These options provide a legal basis for government acquisition of property once a property is determined 
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to be within a set distance of coastal encroachment. In the following subsections I will highlight the 
benefits and drawbacks of each approach, including environmental and property concerns as well as 
each option’s ability to reduce vulnerability to coastal populations. 
4.2.1 Minimum Setbacks 
A minimum setback defines a zone in which new construction is prohibited. In coastal 
environments the distance spans from the ocean to a defined environmental demarcation, such as the 
dune line or vegetation line. This allows for ecosystem preservation, a decrease in property vulnerability 
for new development, and avoidance of shoreline armoring projects. Houses already within the defined 
setback zone can be denied expansion or rebuilding after a disaster. Criterion for rebuilding within the 
setback zone can be set so that structures with greater than 50% damaged are denied rebuilding permits.  
The defined line expands or contracts with the accretion or loss of the line’s basis. If the 
vegetation retreats inland then a zone based on the vegetation line moves inland as well. However, 
basing a minimum setback on an annual survey of the coastline boundary to determine erosion or 
vegetation trends is labor intensive. Ten to twenty-year survey measurements can be the basis of the 
defined line. The defined zone setback distance can be based on 50-100-year predictions of sea level 
rise, or it can be given an arbitrary distance.  
Zone distance should account for ecosystem preservation. Inadequate setbacks can have severe 
impacts on local flora and fauna in combination with sea level rise. A setback of 10m has been shown to 
significantly affect hawksbill sea turtle populations. One-hundred percent of hawksbill nesting areas in 
Barbados would be lost with a 10m setback and an intermediate rise (.5 m) in sea level (Fish et al., 
2008). Not considering the local ecosystem in setback determinations can have large consequences, such 
as decreases in tourist driven revenue or loss of critical wave energy absorbing flora. Setting adequate 
determinations of setbacks requires analysis of local environmental and anthropocentric dynamics. 
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Coastal vulnerability to property is a combination of development proximity and the presence, or lack of 
presence, of environmental barriers to sea level rise. Analysis of local factors in combination with 
predictions of sea level rise can provide policy makers an adequate distance for minimum setbacks.     
4.2.2 Rolling Easements 
Rolling Easements are “a collection of arrangements, under which human activities are required 
to yield the right of way to naturally migrating shores” (Titus, pg. 1313, 1998). The basis of such 
arrangements are strips of land that are defined by and move with the coastal boundary (Strack, 2011). 
All property remains in the possession of the owner of the upland property but the public has the right of 
beach access under the Public Trust Doctrine. In order to achieve this, shore protection must be banned 
in certain areas to allow for the sea encroachment, a rolling design boundary such as vegetation line 
must be in place, building restrictions seaward of this boundary must exist, and encouragement to 
remove property that is seaward of the boundary needs to be established. Public beach access must be 
supported as a condition for justification (Titus, 2011). If a building comes within a certain distance of 
the rolling vegetation line than the building is subject to removal and the owner maintains ownership 
depending on the property rights regulations or agreements made. This makes a takings clause less likely 
and is justified because the property has become an obstruction to public access. This is a powerful tool 
to utilize with increases in sea level.   
Rolling easements allow for ecosystem preservation. Banning coastline armoring enables the 
ecosystem to shift with increases in sea level and for the wetland buffer to be maintained. Also, 
development is unhindered until it is threatened by coastal intrusion. A push landward is fostered with 
the use of rolling easements. Many coastal areas have access roads near the sea. As the sea encroaches 
roads will be pushed back. A road may become damaged and no longer provide access to a property. 
Property owners will not want the government to put in a road through their property to provide access 
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to the now inaccessible property. The government body will be more inclined to push the location of the 
road landward (Titus, 2011).  
Rolling easements can be applied as a government regulation or a property right. A regulation 
restricting what property owner’s can do, i.e. shoreline armoring, and a property right ensures the 
movement of the wetlands with the natural retreat of the shore (Titus, 2011). Either approach has the 
ability to facilitate retreat as long as regulation is enforced and public beach access is a big concern.  
 
5. State Assessment of the Political Will to Retreat from the Coast: Florida, New 
York and North Carolina. 
5.1 Methods of Analysis 
 I used ten factors to identify the political willingness for a state to retreat from the coast. Each 
will be rated on an assessment scale from 0-10. If the question posed is a Boolean measure then a zero 
will be given for a negative answer and a ten will be given for a positive one. The descriptions, 
justification, and methods of analysis are given in each section.  
5.1.1 State Governor Acceptance of Climate Change Rate Increase: 
Because the governor possesses executive state power that can bar legislation and the position is 
seen as an indicator of the overall political climate of the state, the governor’s view on climate change 
will be determined. This measurement is based on official press statements indicating the governor’s 
stance on climate change. The acceptance of anthropogenic climate change rate increase will be given 
ten points, while rejection will be given zero points.        
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5.1.2 Acceptance of Local Sea Level Rise and Efforts to Mitigate: 
Acceptance of local sea level rise is important in policy making for natural hazards. Some states 
have undergone scientific assessments to analyze actual local and regional impacts from sea level rise. 
While the undertaking of coastal analysis shows initiative and concern, the actual implementation of the 
recommendations in these reports may be dismissed or altered in order to preserve coastal economies, 
especially in the area of land development. I will determine whether or not the selected states have 
complied with the recommendations of these reports through analysis of post-report state legislation and 
public statements. States having publicly accepted recommendations, even though they have not acted, 
will be given five points. States that have acted in accordance to the recommendations will be given ten 
points. States that have refused or significantly altered the recommendations will be given zero points.  
5.1.3 No new development in hazard-prone coastal areas: 
Decreasing the density of coastal areas is a key indicator of implementing a coastal retreat plan. 
Looking at the locations of new development can shed light on a state’s commitment to retreat. Because 
retreat is a lengthy process states can, at the minimum, begin the retreat process by preventing new 
development. To measure this, I will research the locations of new development in the selected states 
and determine if they are within a 100-year flood zone. States that have allowed new development in the 
100-year floodplain will receive zero points, while states that have not will receive ten points. 
5.1.4 New Laws to Limit Coastal/Flood-prone Property Rights: 
New legislation limiting the development of coastal/flood-prone property is another indicator of 
effort to reduce vulnerability to coastal hazards. Coastal properties or regions that have become 
inundated frequently can be considered a public nuisance, as they are a burden to local and state 
economies post-disaster. New laws limiting rights to property ownership after a coastal disaster indicate 
state acknowledgement of sea level rise or erosion. Starting from the year 2000, states with recent 
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limitations to coastal/flood-prone private property rights, will receive ten points. States without recent 
laws to limit coastal/flood-prone private property rights will receive zero points.   
5.1.5 Recent Coastline Armoring Ban (Urban): 
Coastline armoring, while protecting coastal communities, can cause the loss of wetlands, 
beaches, and ecosystems when combined with sea level rise or erosion and increase the vulnerability of 
a community from coastal hazards. If coastal retreat is on the state agenda the installation of urban 
coastal armoring must cease allowing natural wetland barriers to absorb energy from storm surges. 
Coastline armoring can only work for so long. A state emphasis on eliminating this practice shows that 
the state has acknowledged the efficiency of wetlands to absorb storm surge impacts and that living in 
these communities that must be protected by these technical fixes are a risk to life, property and 
economic sustainability. I will analyze this factor by researching state effort to limit urban coastline 
armoring since the year 2000. If effort is shown, a simple Boolean analysis, the state will be given a ten. 
If no recent program or law banning urban coastline armoring exists then the state will be given a zero.  
5.1.6 Recent Coastline Armoring Ban (Rural): 
Preventing coastline armoring in rural areas is just as important as in urban areas. Agricultural 
and conservation areas need to be protected to prevent ecosystem collapse and food shortages in the 
coming future. Differentiation is needed to address future research in the weighting of the impacts 
between rural and urban armoring. I will analyze this factor by researching state effort to limit rural 
coastline armoring since the year 2000. If effort is shown, a simple Boolean analysis, the state will be 
given a ten. If no recent program or law banning rural coastline armoring exists then the state will be 
given a zero.  
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5.1.7 Post Disaster Mitigation Plan Including Retreat Contingency: 
Incorporating a plan of retreat for communities indicates state preparedness for coastal retreat. 
To measure this I will research post disaster redevelopment plans in the selected state’s coastal areas to 
determine if there is a consideration of coastal retreat. While this may be an indicator of community 
preparedness rather than state preparedness, it is still an indicator that the state has knowledge of these 
plans and the ability to utilize or readily recreate them. States that outline coastal retreat as an option 
within redevelopment plans will receive ten points. States that allude to coastal retreat in development 
plans (inversely or the main prerogative being redevelopment) without addressing it specifically will 
receive 5 points. States with no plans for retreat will receive zero points. 
5.1.8 Strict Zoning Measures:  
In this research, strict zoning will be defined as minimum setbacks from hazard prone coastal 
areas or rolling easements in place upon coastal property. While differences may be found county to 
county, I will consider the application of these zoning restrictions an indicator of coastal retreat efforts. 
If these exist at all within the state in question the state will be given a ten on the assessment scale. 
However, further research not in the scope of this paper will be needed to determine the actual extent 
and overall impact of minimum setbacks and rolling easements.  
5.1.9 Recent Wetland Preservation, Expansion and Maintenance (Urban): 
Typically, coastal urban areas in the U.S. are not known for wetland preservation efforts, much 
of the wetlands along the urban coast have been filled in for new development or destroyed for resource 
extraction. Yet, wetlands are a key defense against storm surge. They absorb much of the wave energy 
associated with storm surge and can store large amounts of water. Identifying urban areas for wetland 
preservation indicates state understanding of the benefits of wetlands in urban areas. While this does not 
indicate coastal retreat per se, it does indicate state effort to reclaim or maintain the natural buffer zone 
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against storm surge and reduce vulnerability. I will measure urban wetland preservation at a state level 
by researching urban wetland related projects/programs in the selected state. States that have preserved 
their urban wetlands or have undergone a significant expansion of them post-wetland loss will receive a 
ten on the assessment scale, while those that have lost wetlands and have made little effort in 
reclamation will receive a zero.  
5.1.10 Wetland Preservation: 
I divided recent wetland preservation, expansion and maintenance into two separate categories in 
order to highlight the significance of wetlands. Preservation, expansion and maintenance of rural 
wetlands is important in terms of resource extraction. Many coastal wetland areas are high in resources 
such as oil or timber. The extraction of these resources can significantly impact a community’s 
vulnerability by altering the water storage capacity of wetlands and allowing saltwater intrusion into 
freshwater wetlands unable to adapt to this change. Saltwater intrusion promotes the loss of freshwater 
wetlands and in turn the loss of the natural buffer zone. To measure this, I will research the selected 
state’s commitment to wetland preservation in coastal areas. States that have preserved their rural 
wetlands or have undergone significant expansion of them post-wetland loss will receive a ten on the 
assessment scale, while those that have lost wetlands and have made little progress in wetland 
reclamation will receive a zero.  
5.2 Results of Political Willingness Assessment Scale 
Points allotted to each category for each state will be presented in text in the following format 
(10/10 category name). The summarized version of these results are presented in 7.4 in the Appendix. 
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5.2.1 Florida 
The State of Florida accumulated a total of 55 points of the 100 possible. Florida’s state 
governor, Rick Scott, does not accept an increase in the rate of climate change (0/10 Acceptance of 
Climate Change Rate Increase). The state does accept sea level rise as a natural process and is taking the 
measures recommended by the 2010 report by the Florida Oceans and Coastal Council (FOCC) (10/10 
points Accepts Sea Level Rise and Efforts to Mitigate) (Florida Oceans and Coastal Council, 2010). 
Florida has not restricted new development on the coastline (0/10 points No New Development in 
Hazard Prone Areas) but has enacted new laws to limit property rights for new properties and 
reconstruction along coastal areas (10/10 points New Laws to Limit Property Rights). Coastal property 
lines are subject to move with an increase in sea level. However, in 2011, the Florida Senate 
strengthened property rights limiting the power of government on land-use rights by amending the 
Private Property Rights Protection Act. The new law reaffirms the takings clause for regulatory 
decisions. In effect, property that is deemed a nuisance will have a strong case for financial 
compensation from the state (Merlin, 2011). This is not included in the assessment and is an example of 
the complexity of this issue. This act, while lessening burdens on property owners promotes a financial 
barrier to support coastal retreat.  
Florida currently has no shoreline-armoring ban (0/20 points Recent Coastline Armoring Ban 
both Urban and Rural). They have a restrictive permitting process but generally shoreline armoring is 
supported. Post-disaster plans in some counties do include measures of retreat. However, references to 
retreat are vague (5/10 points Post-Disaster Plan of Retreat). For example, the Hillsborough County 
redevelopment plan does not mention retreat at all but does inversely imply that areas that are easily 
relocated can be. The main context of the redevelopment plan is to promote high density development in 
areas that are outside of the Category 1-3 Hurricane zone post-disaster (Hillsborough County, 2010).  
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Florida State has minimum setbacks based upon annual erosion rates for beachfront lots and is 
subject to change with those rates (10/10 Strict Zoning). The setback is reevaluated every ten years 
(NOAA, 2012). 
Wetland preservation in Florida is on the rise in urban areas and significant wetland growth has 
occurred (20/20 points). Since 2000, Florida has passed the Water Resources Development Act of 2000, 
the Everglades Restoration Investment Act, the Lake Okeechobee Protection Act, Senate Bill 54A 
(which gives more funding to the 1994 Everglades Forever Act), the Northern Everglades and Estuaries 
Protection Program, and the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 (provides funding to the 
Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan) (State of Florida, 2011). Urban wetland restoration has 
focused on protecting the habitats of the Florida panther and black bears, (Buening et al., 2007). 
However, the Florida panther was put on the endangered species list because of the loss of much of their 
wetland habitat (Center for Biological Diversity, 2012). Substantial efforts to increase wetland acreage 
overall have been made by Florida to warrant a positive view in this assessment table.  
5.2.2 New York 
New York State is awarded a total of 50 points out of 100 in the assessment table. Governor 
Andrew Cuomo has accepted that climate chance rate increases are a new reality for the State of New 
York and that long term planning needs to include effort to address this (10/10 Governor Accepts 
Climate Change Rate Increase) (Gormley, 2013). The City of New York underwent a planning project to 
assess climate change impacts called PlaNYC. The project includes detailed plans to maintain coastal 
properties and mitigate against future risk. While this plan refuses to retreat from the coastline to protect 
economic assets, it does accept sea level rise and all but one of the recommendations from the New 
York Sea Level Rise Task Force (10/10) Accepts Sea Level Rise and Efforts to Mitigate). The 
recommendation not accepted is to discourage coastal development, but because of disagreement within 
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the Task Force on discouraging coastal development (Ciardullo, 2011) I will still give New York the full 
ten points. This is interesting, as it requires another subcategory within the assessment table to account 
for deviation from what I would expect to be a logical recommendation of a retreat measure within the 
assessment. The recommendations from the task force do not specify retreat measures, only the 
development of long term regional resilience plans subject to translation (Ciardullo, 2011).  
 PlaNYC does allow for new development along the coast (0/10 points No New Development in 
Hazard Zones) but buildings must be built to standards that increase resilience to storm surge (City of 
New York, 2011). I cannot prove that new limitations of property rights have been put on New Yorkers. 
I have found no indication that New York has enacted any new policy since 2000 to limit permits for 
coastal properties or propose new conditions for property owners (0/10 points New Laws to Limit 
Property Rights). I have found that some communities are increasing the amount of environmentally 
protected areas to limit development (The Nature Conservancy, 2013). But this is not a policy aimed 
exclusively at limiting development or posing restrictions on current property owners and so cannot be 
awarded points. To further this null finding PlaNYC indicates that new zoning regulations are being 
created for adaptation to climate change, but they are centered on structural flood resilience codes in the 
100-year floodplain and not on property rights (City of New York, 2011). There is little effort to burden 
property owners with increased property limitations.     
New York State currently has no bans on shoreline armoring (0/20 points Coastline Armoring 
Ban Rural and Urban). While Southampton, NY did ban shoreline armoring (Rather, 2003), it was a city 
effort not a state effort. Due to this the state will not receive any points under the shoreline armoring 
rural and urban categories.  
New York, despite its insistence on not retreating from the coast has recently announced a plan 
to buyout up to $400 million worth of property damaged from Hurricane Sandy in the most vulnerable 
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areas of New York. Property purchased by the state could not be redeveloped (Siders, 2013). How 
effective this plan will be is questionable, the state predicts only 10-15% of eligible homeowners will 
accept the offer (Siders, 2013). Still, this shows that New York State is allowing flexibility in policy 
aimed at climate change impacts (10/10 points Post-Disaster Plan of Retreat) 
New York State has two different minimum setback lines determined by Coastal Erosion Hazard 
Areas Act; a natural protective feature line, dependent upon the coastal features that provide protection 
for upland property; and a structural hazard line dependent upon projected coastal erosion rates over 
forty years (New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 2013). Natural protective 
feature lines vary depending upon the feature. For example, setbacks for dune areas are a minimum of 
25 feet and setbacks in beach areas are 100 feet The structural hazard line is used in areas experiencing 
more than a foot of erosion annually (New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 
2013). The application of this measure does allow for restrictions to new development in coastal zones 
(10/10 points Strict Zoning) 
Wetland preservation and expansion is on the rise on New York. The New York Tidal Wetlands 
Act protects and seeks to expand wetlands throughout the state. Also, part of PlaNYC is an increase in 
wetland area to establish soft mitigation structures that help absorb storm surge energy. This is through 
the New York Wetlands Strategy, an action plan of how to protect preserve and restore coastal 
ecosystems (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2012). Efforts to increase urban wetland expansion are 
significant in New York (10/10 points Urban Wetland Conservation Effort). However, 85% of coastal 
wetlands in New York have been lost over the past century and not reclaimed (0/10 points Wetland 
Preservation) (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2012).  
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5.2.3 North Carolina 
North Carolina State Ex-Governor Bev Perdue recently prohibited calculating sea level change 
for use in regulatory measures until 2016 by not acting on House Bill 819. The bill states, “The Division 
of Coastal Management shall be the only state agency authorized to develop rates of sea level rise and 
shall do so only at the request of the Commission. These rates shall only be determined using historical 
data, and these data shall be limited to the time period following the year 1900. Rates of sea level rise 
may be extrapolated linearly to estimate future rates of rise but shall not include scenarios of accelerated 
rates of sea level rise” (General Assembly of North Carolina, 2011). The state legislature effectively 
barred action on regulating on sea level rise for four years. The North Carolina legislature also denied 
the North Carolina Sea Level Rise Assessment Report by the North Carolina Coastal Resource 
Commission. This report highlighted that a 39-inch increase in sea level is possible by 2100 (North 
Carolina Coastal Resource Commission, 2010). The legislature instead adopted an 8-inch increase in sea 
level (0/10 Accepts Sea Level Rise and Efforts to Mitigate) (Masters, 2012; Union of Concerned 
Scientist, 2012). 
The current governor, Pat McCrory, has carefully not expressed his opinion on climate change 
rate increase. However, after elected, Governor McCrory appointed John Skvarla, a climate change 
skeptic, to the head of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (0/10 Governor Accepts 
Climate Change Rate Increase) (Institute for Southern Studies, 2013).    
North Carolina continues to develop within the 100-year floodplain (0/10 No New Development 
in Hazard Zones). Construction in hazard zones is not allowed under the Coastal Area Management Act 
if an existing property has suffered a net loss equal or greater than 50% of the building value or if the 
lowest floor of the structure is a foot above the expected depth of a 100-year flood (Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Storm Water Services, 2013; New Hanover County, 2013).  
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The state has enacted new laws to limit property rights in coastal areas (10/10 New Laws to 
Limit Property Rights). New minimum setback standards based on the size of a structure are now 
implemented statewide (10/10 Strict Zoning). As the size of the structure increases so does the distance 
of the setback (NOAA, 2012). Also, North Carolina has a statewide ban on shoreline armoring (20/20 
Recent Coastline Armoring Ban Urban and Rural). This ban promotes statewide acquisition of 
properties under the Public Beach and Coastal Waterfront Access Program. Existing structures that 
restrict public access to the coast may be subject to acquisition. Land acquisition projects in North 
Carolina are minimally funded however, with only $1 million annually allocated to the Public Beach and 
Coastal Waterfront Access Program and other competing interests may be prioritized (NOAA, 2012c).  
Coastal counties in North Carolina have similar objectives within their hazard mitigation plans. 
Coastal counties with complete hazard mitigation action plans suggest relocation of vulnerable 
structures is a method of disaster prevention (Brunswick County, 2011; Union County, 2013). North 
Carolina does have contingencies of retreat on the county level (10/10 Post-Disaster Plan of Retreat).   
Wetland acreage in North Carolina has decreased rapidly (0/10 Wetland Preservation). From the 
1970’s to 1990 wetland area in North Carolina decreased by 1.2 million acres in one of the most 
extensive losses recorded in any U.S. state (Dahl & Johnson, 1991). North Carolina continues to lose 
wetlands as development, timber companies, agriculture and highway projects remain competing 
interests to wetland preservation (North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, 2013).  
The North Carolina Wetland Restoration Program is a non-regulatory and voluntary plan to 
increase wetland acreage and quality. The program started in 1996 and has not significantly expanded 
the wetland acreage as the majority of the projects focus only on wetland preservation and not wetland 
growth (North Carolina Department of the Environment and Natural Resources, 2003). There is also the 
Ecosystem Enhancement Program (EEP). As of 2005, the EEP had not undergone projects long enough 
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for an evaluation of success to be determined (Engler, 2005). These projects do intend to increase 
wetland areas in both rural and urban environments but have yet to show significant wetland growth 
(0/10 Urban Wetland Conservation Effort).  
6. Conclusions 
The results showed that all of the states analyzed had a similar score in the assessment table. 
Each state had different strengths; Florida, significant effort in wetland preservation; New York, a 
government willing to accept climate change induced increases in sea level rise and planning to address 
it; North Carolina, a statewide shoreline armoring ban. Many problems associated with the limitation of 
the assessment factors arose. The minimum setback component of the strict zoning factor is not an ideal 
factor determinant. Each coastal state has a minimum setback of some sort, whether it is an arbitrary line 
or based upon erosion rates. Minimum setbacks need to be further defined to some demarcation 
indicative of political responsibility for the vulnerability of coastal populations, or eliminated as a 
determinant factor. None of these states showed explicit use of rolling easements as a way to justify land 
acquisition. Keeping rolling easements as a determinant factor in strict zoning is more indicative of 
progressive policy towards coastal retreat.  
The analysis of the state of Florida showed that new laws to limit coastal property rights could be 
useless if there are laws that increase property owner power. The strengthening of the Private Property 
Rights Protection Act decreased the probability of state land acquisition without a takings issue rising. 
Florida will now be hesitant to deem property as a nuisance, allowing sustained vulnerability in hazard 
areas. New laws limiting coastal property rights are subject to existing laws. The relationship between 
state laws needs to be further analyzed to determine the relative impact of legislative measures to 
promote coastal retreat.     
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The analysis of the State of New York showed that recommendations for mitigation do not 
always contain a retreat contingency. I had expected this recommendation in every assessment of local 
sea level rise increase from the scientific community. It was because of the retreat contingency that I 
determined the factor to be useful for highlighting political will. The assessment also shows that climate 
change affirming governors do not give up coastal property so easily. Not agreeing to the new 
development restrictions seems counter productive if Governor Cuomo’s plan is to decrease 
vulnerability. At the same time, Governor Cuomo instituted a buyout program for highly vulnerable, 
damaged properties to address climate model predictions and reduce future vulnerability.   
Analysis of North Carolina showed that progressive law promoting coastal retreat does come 
from states that do not accept climate change increases in sea level or follow local scientific assessment 
recommendations for the impacts of sea level increase. The banning of shoreline armoring statewide is a 
highly progressive move based on the right to beach access. This law provides North Carolina the ability 
to acquire land and property when property becomes a nuisance to beach access. Counties within North 
Carolina have laid out relocation plans for vulnerable property, another progressive move facilitating 
coastal retreat.  
This research is meant to be a springboard into a larger, more in-depth, analysis of political 
willingness to retreat from the coast. I expected to find that this assessment scale does not fully 
encompass the political willingness to retreat from the coast and that is indeed the case. There are many 
factors involved, which cannot be fully represented in these findings. Further and more in-depth research 
is needed to determine the relative weight of each factor within each state, subject to the overall positive 
or negative impacts of the separate state policies or actions taken. The given weight to these state 
policies or actions then needs to be compared state to state to provide a relative state scale of action on 
coastal retreat.  
 35 
7. Appendix 
7.1 Sea Level Rise Predictions 
Observed and predicted sea level rise. There is a strong consensus in the scientific community that the 2007 IPCC estimates 
of 21st century sea level rise are far too low. Observations in the first decade of the century support that view. Most experts 
think the projections of Rahmstorf are more likely. Credit: Copyright ©2009 Jeff Masters 
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